A decision-making body may utilize a wide variety of different strategies when required to make a collective decision. In principle, we would like to use the most effective decision rule, that is, the rule yielding the highest probability of making the correct decision. However, in reality we often have to choose a decision rule out of some restricted family of rules. Therefore, it is important to be able to rank various families of rules. In this paper we consider three classes of decision rules: (i) balanced expert rules, (ii) the so-called single expert rules, and (iii) restricted majority rules. For the first two classes, we show that, as we deviate from the best rule in the family, the effectiveness of the decision rule decreases. For the last class, we obtain a very different phenomenon: any inner ranking is possible.
Introduction
There are many situations in which an important decision is to be taken by a panel of experts, who are expected to have sufficient knowledge of the subject so that their decision will be more accurate than random guessing. Examples include boards of directors, surgical teams, and admissions committees. We concentrate on the uncertain dichotomous choice model, which goes back as far as Condorcet (1785) . In this model, a group of n decision makers is required to select one of two alternatives, only one of which is correct. We assume that the alternatives are symmetric. Namely, the a priori probabilities of the alternatives are equal, and the benefit or loss associated with a correct or incorrect decision, respectively, is the same in both cases. Each expert i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, selects independently of the others and has his own correctness probability p i , indicating his ability to identify the correct alternative. It is also assumed that 1 2 ≤ p i < 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and, with no loss of generality, that p i ≥ p j , 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n. The correctness probabilities are independent of which alternative is the correct one (cf. Nitzan and Paroush (1985) ). A decision rule translates the individual opinions of the members, or a voting profile, into a group decision. A decision rule v is optimal for a group of experts with correctness probabilities p = (p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n ) if it maximizes the effectiveness π(v, p), namely, the likelihood of the group to make a correct choice. our results for committees of arbitrary size. Section 4 contains the main results, and Section 5 is devoted to the proofs. We summarize and conclude the paper in Section 6.
Weighted majority rule families
Let us first formally define the families of weighted majority rules we investigate.
Definition 1.
The balanced expert rule of order k, where 3 ≤ k ≤ n, is denoted by BER n,k and characterized by assigning weight of k − 2 to the most competent expert, weight 1 to each of the k − 1 next experts, and zero weight to the remaining n − k experts. Namely, the rule is given by the vector
Definition 2. Let n, k be of the same parity, where 1 ≤ k ≤ n. The single expert rule of order k is denoted by SER n,k and given by the vector
).
Definition 3.
Let k = 2s + 1, where 1 ≤ s < n/2. The restricted majority rule of order k is denoted by RMR k and is equivalent to the simple majority rule, applied to the subgroup of the k most competent experts. Namely, the rule is given by the vector
For a committee of n experts, the competence structure is defined either by a vector of correctness probabilities (p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n ) or, equivalently, by a vector of expertise levels (α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α n ), where α i = p i /q i and q i = 1 − p i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Let us now define the criterion for ranking rules. For a group of experts with competence structure p, we define a weak order ' ' between decision rules by f g if π(f, p) ≤ π(g, p). For convenience, we also use the notation '≺', ' ', ' ', and '∼' (the latter being an equivalence relation).
We employ the method introduced by Sapir (2005) for ranking pairs of adjacent restricted majority rules. This method is based on the following notion.
where
In the next sections we will use the following theorem and lemma, based on Sapir (2005) .
Theorem 1. For each vector of expertise levels
α = (α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α n ) and odd k, 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 2,
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The first part of the theorem is proved in Sapir (2005) . A slight modification of this proof gives the second part of the theorem. Lemma 1. Let a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ), where n ≥ 3 is odd and a 1 ≥ a 2 ≥ · · · ≥ a n > 0. Set b = (a 1 , . . . , a n−2 ). Then, CM(a) ≤ CM(b), with equality if and only if a 1 = a 2 = · · · = a n .
The inequality CM(a) ≤ CM(b) is the contents of Lemma 1 of Sapir (2005) . Going over the proof there, it is easy to establish that we have an equality if and only if a 1 = a 2 = · · · = a n .
Motivation and illustration
Consider the set of all weighted majority rules for a committee size of n = 5, namely, the rules (1, 0, 0, 0, 0), (3, 1, 1, 1, 1), (2, 1, 1, 1, 0), (3, 2, 2, 1, 1), (2, 2, 1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 1, 1, 1), and (1, 1, 1, 0, 0). (In fact, any other vector of weights is equivalent to one of the above; see Nitzan and Paroush (1985, p. 21) .)
The motivation to our present study goes back to Karotkin et al. (1988) and Karotkin (1998) . It was shown there that the above rules can be arranged in the undirected graph depicted in Figure 1 , where each node represents a rule and each edge corresponds to a pair of symmetric distinguishing voting profiles. For instance, the voting profiles (+1, −1, −1, −1, −1) and (−1, +1, +1, +1, +1) distinguish between the rules (1, 0, 0, 0, 0) and (3, 1, 1, 1, 1). Note that any two rules are distinguished by some set of voting profiles. In the graph, however, rules are adjacent only if they are distinguished by a single pair of symmetric voting profiles.
For each particular committee competence structure, Karotkin (1998) Figure 2 (b). It was shown that there exists a directed path from the node corresponding to the optimal rule to any other node. We refer the reader to Karotkin (1998) for more details.
Suppose that, for a certain committee, (1, 0, 0, 0, 0) is the optimal rule. From the result of Karotkin, it follows that (3, 2, 2, 1, 1) (1, 1, 1, 0, 0) and (3, 2, 2, 1, 1) (2, 2, 1, 1, 1).
However, it does not specify which of the rules (1, 1, 1, 0, 0) or (2, 2, 1, 1, 1) is preferable. In fact, for this committee, there are at most three possible rankings among all rules. Namely, (1, 1, 1, 0, 0)
(1, 0, 0, 0, 0) (3, 1, 1, 1, 1) (2, 1, 1, 1, 0) (3, 2, 2, 1, 1) (2, 2, 1, 1, 1) (1, 1, 1, 1, 1)
Figure 1: Graphs of weighted majority rules for n = 5, where
, and x 6 = (+1, −1, −1, +1, +1).
(1, 1, 1, 0, 0)
(1, 0, 0, 0, 0) (3, 1, 1, 1, 1) (2, 1, 1, 1, 0) (3, 2, 2, 1, 1) (2, 2, 1, 1, 1) (1, 1, 1, 1, 1) Similar analysis was performed in the case of other optimal rules. Table 1 summarizes our results. The second column provides the number of rankings, which are consistent with Figure 1 . For example, if the rule (3, 2, 2, 1, 1) is optimal then there are 6 1,2,3 = 60 ways to order the six other rules. The third column gives the number of rankings that were actually observed. Thus, these columns provide upper and lower bounds on the number of possible rankings among all rules. 
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The following proposition shows that there exist rankings that cannot be realized even though they are not eliminated by the graph analysis performed above. Proposition 1. 1 . If (3, 1, 1, 1, 1) (2, 1, 1, 1, 0) then (1, 0, 0, 0, 0) (1, 1, 1, 0, 0). (2, 2, 1, 1, 1) (3, 2, 2, 1, 1) then (1, 1, 1, 0, 0) (1, 0, 0, 0, 0) . (3, 2, 2, 1, 1) (2, 1, 1, 1, 0) then (1, 1, 1, 0, 0) (1, 0, 0, 0, 0) . 4. (3, 1, 1, 1, 1) (3, 2, 2, 1, 1) if and only if (1, 0, 0, 0, 0) (1, 1, 1, 0, 0) .
If
Proof. We will prove the first part. The rest of the proposition can be easily proved using similar arguments. Observe that (3, 1, 1, 1, 1) (2, 1, 1, 1, 0) implies that p 1 q 2 q 3 q 4 p 5 > q 1 p 2 p 3 p 4 q 5 , or, equivalently, α 1 α 5 > α 2 α 3 α 4 . Since α 4 ≥ α 5 , we have α 1 α 5 > α 2 α 3 α 4 ≥ α 2 α 3 α 5 and α 1 > α 2 α 3 . From Theorem 1, it follows that (1, 0, 0, 0, 0) (1, 1, 1, 0, 0).
It follows from Proposition 1 that the empirical results in the third column of Table 1 are in fact the precise numbers of actual possibilities. For instance, suppose that (1, 1, 1, 1, 1) is the optimal rule. The following ranking is impossible by part 3 of the proposition: (1, 1, 1, 1, 1) (2, 2, 1, 1, 1) (3, 2, 2, 1, 1) (2, 1, 1, 1, 0) (3, 1, 1, 1, 1) (1, 0, 0, 0, 0) (1, 1, 1, 0, 0).
In Appendix A we provide all 120 possible rankings for group size n = 5. The above discussion shows that there exists interesting information regarding possible rankings of weighted majority rules, which does not follow from the structure of the graph of Karotkin (1998) . In the following two sections we consider decision bodies of arbitrary sizes. In the general case, the identification of all possible rankings between all rules becomes a formidable task. We focus on several special families of rules and identify all possible rankings within each family.
Main results
Theorem 2. For each n and p, the sequence of decision rules BER n,k is mound-shaped as a function of k. That is, for some
Example 1. For n = 6 and competence vector p = (0.98, 0.8, 0.8, 0.7, 0.7, 0.5), we have BER 6,3 BER 6,4 BER 6,5 BER 6,6 . For p = (0.9, 0.85, 0.84, 0.7, 0.7, 0.6), we have BER 6,3 BER 6,4 BER 6,5 BER 6,6 .
Theorem 3. For each n and p, the sequence of decision rules SER n,k is mound-shaped as a function of k. That is, for some
Theorems 2 and 3 might lead us to believe that the property of mound-shapedness is common to all sequences of rules that are monotonic in some sense. Somewhat surprisingly, the next theorem shows that the sequence of restricted majority rules behaves in a completely different way. (σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 , . . . , σ m ) of the set {1, 3, 5, . . . , 2m − 1}, where m = (n + 1)/2 , there exists a vector of correctness probabilities for which In fact, it will become apparent from the proof that Theorem 4 also holds if some of the ' 's in (1) are replaced by '∼'. For instance, for n = 11, there exists a vector of correctness probabilities such that RMR 5 ∼ RMR 9 RMR 3 RMR 1 ∼ RMR 11 RMR 7 .
Theorem 4. For each n and permutation
RMR σ 1 RMR σ 2 · · · RMR σ m .(1)
Proofs
Proof of Theorem 3. Let us first show that if, for some k, we have SER n,k+2 SER n,k then SER n,k SER n,k−2 . The voting profiles distinguishing between SER n,k+2 and SER n,k are those profiles in which the first expert is supported by exactly (n − k)/2 − 1 other experts. Similarly, voting profiles that distinguish between SER n,k and SER n,k−2 are those in which the first expert is supported by exactly (n − k)/2 other experts. Let m = (n − k)/2. The condition SER n,k+2 SER n,k implies that
where N1 ,l = {E | E ⊆ {2, . . . , n}, |E| = l}. This may be written in the form
or, equivalently,
We have to prove the analogue with m instead of m − 1:
Observe that
Since α j ≥ 1 for 1 ≤ j ≤ n, this implies that
Similarly, 
Combining (2), (4), and (5) , we obtain (3).
In the same way we show that if, for some k, we have SER n,k−2 SER n,k then SER n,k SER n,k+2 .
Proof of Theorem 2. Let us first show that if, for some k, we have BER n,k+1
BER n,k then BER n,k BER n,k−1 . The voting profiles distinguishing between BER n,k+1 and BER n,k are those profiles in which the first and (k + 1)st expert are opposed by the experts 2, . . . , k. Similarly, the voting profiles that distinguish between BER n,k and BER n,k−1 are those in which the first and the kth expert are opposed by the experts 2, . . . , k − 1. The inequality BER n,k+1 BER n,k implies that
This can be written in the form
which is equivalent to
This proves that BER n,k BER n,k−1 .
In the same way we show that if, for some k, we have BER n,k−1 BER n,k then BER n,k BER n,k+1 . The two implications prove the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 4. It suffices to deal with the case of odd n. In fact, if n is even, and p = (p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n−1 ) gives any required ordering of the RMR i s for n − 1 experts, then the vector p = (p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n ) gives the same ordering for n experts for any p n ∈ ( 1 2 , p n−1 ).
Consider the function f :
To prove the theorem, it suffices to show that if and that f 1 (r 0 ) = f 2 (r 0 ) = · · · = f m (r 0 ). Next, let us show that f is differentiable and its Jacobian matrix is invertible for any r = (r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r m ) ∈ A. In fact, consider a group of experts with competence vector v(r), where r ∈ A. We have f 1 (r) = r 1 , so that ∂f 1 (r)/∂r 1 = 1 > 0. For 2 ≤ i ≤ m, denote by P i,k the probability that at least k out of the 2i −3 most competent experts choose the correct alternative, and denote by Q i,k the probability that exactly k of them do so. Then
Since r ∈ A, significantly small changes in r do not change the ranking of the experts, so that P i,i and each of the Q i,j s are polynomial in the variables r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r i−1 . In particular, f is differentiable on A. Now
As r belongs to A, sufficiently small changes in r j for j > i do not effect f i (r), so that ∂f i (r)/∂r j = 0 for j > i. Thus, the Jacobian matrix of f is lower triangular with nonzero entries along the diagonal for every r ∈ A. In particular, it is invertible. From Theorem 13.5 of Apostol (1974) , it follows that f is an open mapping on A. Since f takes r 0 to a point on the main diagonal of R m , this means that, for any permutation (σ 1 , σ 2 , . . . , σ m ) of {1, 2, . . . , m}, there exists a point s = (s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s m ) ∈ f (A) such that s σ 1 > s σ 2 > · · · > s σ m . This completes the proof.
Discussion and summary
In this paper we considered three classes of decision rules-balanced expert rules, single expert rules, and restricted majority rules. These classes are 'similar' and 'different' in various aspects. In the first two families, the rules assign much of the decisional power to the most competent expert, whereas the restricted majority rules distribute it equally between all influential experts. In the context of our results, the first two families also share the same property of mound-shaped ranking, whereas in the family of restricted majority rules, any inner ranking is possible. On the other hand, both the family of single expert rules and the family of restricted majority rules contain the simple majority rule and the expert rule as the polar members. However, the two sequences of rules formed by the two families starting at the expert rule and ending at the simple majority rule have very different structures with respect to their ranking properties.
Appendix A. All possible rankings for n = 5 1. (1, 0, 0, 0, 0) (3, 1, 1, 1, 1) (2, 1, 1, 1, 0) (3, 2, 2, 1, 1) (2, 2, 1, 1, 1) (1, 1, 1, 1, 1) (1, 1, 1, 0, 0) .
